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Battle of Magdhaba Information

The Battle of Magdhaba (officially known by the British as the Affair of Magdhaba) took place on 23 December 1916 south and east of Bir Lahfan in the Sinai desert, some 18–25 miles (29–40 km) inland from the Mediterranean coast and the town of El Arish.[1][Note 1] This engagement formed part of the Sinai and Palestine Campaign of World War I.

The Ottoman Army had been forced to retreat after the British Empire victory at the Battle of Romani. Subsequently the area from the Suez Canal to Bir el Abd was consolidated, garrisoned and patrolled while the railway and water pipeline were steadily being constructed eastwards towards Bir el Mazar.

By December, construction of the infrastructure had sufficiently progressed to enable the Allied advance to recommence during the evening of 20 December; the following morning, the mounted force reached El Arish to find it had been abandoned by the Ottoman Army. The Ottomans, however, maintained a strong defensive position at Magdhaba, some 18–30 miles (29–48 km) inland to the southeast (on the Wadi el Arish). After another night march by the ANZAC Mounted Division the attack on Magdhaba was launched by Australian, British and New Zealand mounted troops against a well-entrenched Ottoman force defending a series of six redoubts. During the day's fierce fighting, the British Empire mounted units' tactics eventually prevailed; the Ottoman defenders surrendered in the late afternoon.

Contents

Background

After the Battle of Romani in August 1916, the Australian and New Zealand (ANZAC) Mounted Division (commanded by Major-General Henry George Chauvel) had pushed the Ottoman Army's "Desert Force" (commanded by Kress von Kressenstein) back out of Bir el Abd and across the Sinai to El Arish.[2][3]

Map of the Sinai from the Suez Canal zone to Rafa when the railway reached Bir el Mazar

The British War Office's stated policy in October 1916 was to maintain offensive operations on the Western Front while remaining on the defensive everywhere else.[4] However, the battle of attrition on the Somme (coupled with a change of Britain's Prime Minister; Lloyd George succeeded Asquith on 7 December) made attacks on Germany's weak points away from the Western Front desirable. Encouraged to seek success in the East without any reinforcements, General Murray (Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force) thought that an advance to El Arish would threaten the southern Ottoman Empire and prevent the transfer of Ottoman units to other theatres of war.[5][6]

Murray's responsibilities extended from the Western Frontier Force, waging the continuing campaign against the Senussi in the Egyptian Western Desert, to the Eastern Force in the Sinai Peninsula.[7] He commanded four infantry divisions of 6,000 men; the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division and 52nd (Lowland) Division, which served in the Sinai region with the six mounted brigades; the ANZAC Mounted Division's 1st, 2nd, 3rd Light Horse; the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the 5th Mounted Yeomanry Brigades with the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade.[8] Murray considered this force to be under strength by at least a division for an advance to Beersheba, but felt he could gain El Arish on the Mediterranean Sea and form an effective base there for further operations.[4][6]

Operations in the Sinai

Laying the railway across the Sinai

By mid-September 1916 the ANZAC Mounted Division had pursued the retreating Ottoman Army along the northern route across the Sinai Peninsula to the outpost at Bir el Mazar. The Maghara Hills, in the interior of the Sinai Peninsula, was also attacked in mid-October by an Allied force based on the Suez Canal. Although not won at the time, all these positions were eventually abandoned by their Ottoman garrisons in the face of a growing Allied force. Along the British lines of communication, garrisons were developed to patrol and protect the continuing advance of the railway and water pipeline built by the Egyptian Labour Corps.[9] These lines were marked by railway stations and sidings, airfields, signal installations and standing camps where troops could be accommodated in tents and huts. At this time the Egyptian Expeditionary Force had a ration strength of 150,000 British and 6,000 Indian troops, plus 13,000 Egyptian labourers in the Egyptian Labour Corps.[6]

Ottoman military town of Hafir el Aujah, principal desert base

Ottoman operations in the Sinai were sustained and supported by their principal desert base at Hafir el Auja, located just across the Egyptian frontier in Ottoman Empire territory. This base was in turn supplied along road and railway links to Beersheba and Gaza, with infrastructure linking to Jaffa, Jerusalem, Damascus and Istanbul.[Note 2] The Ottoman garrison in the Sinai could enjoy rest periods at el Auja base; the base could also supply and support garrisons in the area with reinforcements, ammunition and rations. In the case of Magdhaba, water was available from wells in the village. If left intact, Ottoman forces at El Arish, Magdhaba and el Auja could seriously threaten the British advance along the north route towards the Egyptian/Ottoman frontier.[10][11][Note 3]

Keogh's Map 3 shows the desert – Magdhaba and the railway from Auja to Beersheba.

However, before the British Empire advance to El Arish could begin the problems created by the absence of a water supply between El Mazar and El Arish had to be solved. The countryside within 20 miles (32 km) of El Arish was thoroughly explored, and all wells tested and noted; by mid-December, the pipeline's eastward progress made it possible to store sufficient water at Maadan (Kilo. 128). By this time, it was also possible to concentrate sufficiently large numbers of Egyptian Camel Transport Corps camels and camel-drivers to carry water forward in support the attacking force.[12][13][14]

The campaign across the Sinai desert required great determination (as well as conscientious attention to detail by all involved) to ensure that ammunition, rations and every pint of water and bale of horse fodder required was available when needed. The British base was some 30 miles (48 km) west of El Arish (almost at the limits of their lines of communication), making mounted operations so far from base in such barren country extremely hazardous and difficult. By comparison, cavalry actions during the European Wars of 1866 and 1870 and the American Civil War raids took place in fairly close proximity to the units' bases and in country where food and water were readily available. But for long-range desert operations, it was necessary that all supplies be well-organised and suitably packaged for transportation on camels (moving with the column or following closely behind). It was vital, also, that the soldiers were well trained for the conditions. If a man was left behind in the inhospitable Sinai he might die in the burning desert sun during the day or bitter cold at night; if a water bottle was accidentally tipped up or leaked, it could mean no water for its owner for perhaps 24 hours in these extreme temperatures.[15]

German station at Abou Augeileh

Mounted troops worked to provide protective screens for the construction, patrolling newly occupied areas and carrying out reconnaissance augmenting aerial photographs to improve maps of the newly-occupied areas.[16] Detailed reconnaissance was carried out in the area of el Kossaima, Hafir el Auja and Abu Aweigila by the Australian Flying Corps on 15 November, when 24 photographs of all camps and dumps were taken.[17]

While patrolling and reconnaissance continued and the infrastructure was being extended, Chauvel (commander of the ANZAC Mounted Division) was granted six weeks' leave. He travelled to the U.K. on 25 October, returning to duty on 12 December 1916.[18] During this time Murray moved his headquarters back from Ismailia on the Canal to Cairo, and Lawrence (who had commanded No. 3 Section of the Suez Canal Defences) was transferred to the Western Front.[19][7][20]

In October, Lieutenant General Sir Charles Dobell was appointed to command the newly-created Eastern Force.[21] With his headquarters at Kantara, Dobell became responsible for the security of the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula.[9] Five days before Chauvel's return, on 7 December 1916, General Murray appointed Lieutenant General Sir Philip Chetwode commander of the newly-formed Desert Column. Chetwode had commanded cavalry on the Western Front, pursuing the retreating Germans after the First Battle of the Marne. The new command structure of Desert Column grouped the 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division (serving in the Suez Canal Defences) with the 42nd and 52nd Infantry Divisions, the ANZAC Mounted Division, the 5th Mounted Yeomanry Brigade and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade.[22]

Yesterday we were inspected by General Chauvel who is just back from his trip to England. We were all pleased to see him as he is well liked by both officers and men. A chap feels pretty safe with a leader like him. I saw him riding backwards and forwards under heavy fire at Romani and Bir-el-Abd and it seemed that he did not know what danger was. Now that he is back we don't think it will be long before we are at the Turks again.

Trooper Ingham[23]

By early December 1916 the railway had covered half the distance from Kantara to the Palestine border; it reached Bir el Mazar, and British intelligence reported the Ottoman Army was building a railway from Beersheba to Magdhaba.[10] Mounted patrols on the outskirts of el Arish found 1,600 well-entrenched Ottoman troops holding the town, supported by forces based 25 miles (40 km) southeast of el Arish on the banks of the Wadi el Arish at Magdhaba and Abu Aweigila.[6]

Advance to El Arish

On 20 December, a week after Chauvel returned from leave, the advance to El Arish began with the Anzac Mounted Division leaving Bir Gympie at 21:45. They moved out without the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, which was in the rear patrolling the lines of communication.[Note 4] The 1st and 3rd Australian Light Horse, the New Zealand Mounted Rifle, the 5th Mounted Yeomanry Brigade and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigades made the trek to El Arish.[24]

On the day they set out, Australian airmen reported that the Maghara Hills (in the center of the Sinai Peninsula) and El Arish appeared to have been evacuated by the Ottoman Army.[25] As the ANZAC Mounted Division approached Um Zughla at 02:00 on 21 December a halt was called until 03:30, when the trek continued to El Arish. Forward troops entered the town at 07:45 to make contact with the civil population and see about water. Only one prisoner was captured; lines of observation were set up, maintaining a close watch over the country east and south of El Arish. By 16:00 the 1st and 3rd Light Horse, New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigades were in bivouac at El Arish. The only casualties during the day were two members of the 1st Light Horse Brigade, who were blown up by a stranded mine on the beach.[26]

View of El Arish

On 22 December (the day after El Arish was occupied) the leading brigade of the 52nd Infantry Division reached the town; with the 5th Mounted Yeomanry Brigade, it fortified and garrisoned the position.[27] At 10:00, Chetwode landed on the beach opposite ANZAC Divisional Headquarters to begin his appointment as commander of Desert Column.[28][8] Chetwode reported that he had arranged rations and horse feed to arrive at El Arish at 16:30 with a view of the ANZAC Mounted Division advancing on Magdhaba, 18 miles (29 km) away. With essential rations organised, the division commanded by Chauvel marched out at 00:45 on the night of 22–23 December.[29][22][8]

Prelude

Ottoman force

The garrison at Magdhaba was increased from 500 to about 1,400 Ottoman soldiers. There may have been as many as 2,000, consisting of two battalions of the 80th Infantry Regiment (27th Infantry Division, attached to the 3rd Infantry Division for most of 1916) of about 600 men from the 80th Infantry Regiment (2/80th Battalion, commanded by Izzet Bey and the 3/80th Battalion, commanded by Rushti Bey) and a camel company (without camels). Two squads from the 80th Machine Gun Company (said to have been armed with only one machine gun) remained at Magdhaba, while the remainder of the company was sent north to Shellal. The defending force was supported by a Mountain Battery of four obsolete Krupps 7.5 cm Gebirgskanone M 1873 guns on loan from the 1st Mountain Regiment, since the 80th Regiment's own artillery battery was stationed at Nekhl. Attached to the Ottoman garrison at Magdhaba were a number of military service units (including elements of the 3rd Company of the 8th Engineer Battalion, 27th Medical Company, 43rd Mobile Hospital and the 46th Cooking Unit). The garrison was commanded by Kadri Bey, Commanding Officer of the 80th IR.[30][31]

The first indications of the Ottoman Army's withdrawal from El Arish had been seen by Allied planes as early as 25 October so their retirement was not a sudden, panicked reaction. A series of well-situated and developed redoubts made up the Ottoman position at Magdhaba which were almost impossible to locate on the flat ground near the Wadi el Arish.[32][33] The garrison occupied about six fortified redoubts, linked by a series of entrenchments, on both sides of the wadi over an area of about 2 miles (3.2 km) from east to west. They were inspected the day before the attack (on 22 December 1916) by von Kressenstein, commander of the Ottoman "Desert Force", who drove from his base at Hafir el Auja. He expressed satisfaction with the garrison's ability to withstand any assault.[34]

Being about 40 miles (64 km) from the British railhead and 25 miles (40 km) from El Arish, the Ottoman Army probably did not think a force large enough to successfully attack the garrison could be organised before the British had established a supply base at El Arish. In this they underestimated the determination of the Australian, British and New Zealand forces.[35] They would also have been unaware of the arrival of a new British commander, Lieutenant General Chetwode and his staff, who had organised the necessary logistical support for an immediate long range attack.[36]

British Empire force

The assault on Magdhaba was made by:

Guard systems for marching column

This force (which may have numbered as many as 7,000 men) marched out about midnight. They rode for 40 minutes, dismounted and led their horse for 10 minutes before halting for 10 minutes every hour until almost 05:00, when the column halted on the plain 4 miles (6.4 km) from Magdhaba. The column had been guided by scouts although the garrison's fires had been clearly visible for about an hour, indicating an attacking force was not expected to set out so soon after the 30 miles (48 km) ride to El Arish.[8]

The attacking force was supported by the Royal Flying Corps 5th Wing stationed at Mustabig. This was a composite formation of the No. 14 (British) Squadron and No. 1 Squadron Australian Flying Corps (also known as No. 67 Australian Squadron). It was ordered to provide close air support, long-range scouting and long-range strategic bombing. One British and 10 Australian planes dropped a hundred bombs on Magdhaba on 22 December; during the battle they bombed and machine gunned the area, but targets were difficult to find.[39][40]

Battle

At 06:30 the No. 14 (British) Squadron and the Australian Flying Corps' No. 1 Squadron attacked the Ottoman defences, drawing some fire which revealed the locations of machine guns and trenches. Five redoubts were identified, arranged around the village, housing the only supply of water in the area. During the battle they also provided frequent reports (14 were received between 07:50 and 15:15) giving estimated positions, strength, and movements of the Ottoman garrison. These were often given verbally by the observer, after the pilot landed near headquarters.[39][41]

Magdhaba village

Following Chauvel's plan, a strongly enveloping action was quickly initiated.[42][43] The main attack (coming from the north and east) was made by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade (commanded by Brigadier General Chaytor), which moved in a line of troop columns. They were supported by Vickers and Lewis guns and the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, this force under the command of Chaytor. Their ground attack began on the virtually featureless battleground (except for the village and the Wadi El Arish), when Allied artillery opened fire as Chaytor's group moved towards the Ottoman garrison's right and rear. Despite heavy Ottoman fire some of the mounted troops found cover and dismounted about 1,600 yards (1.5 km) from the redoubts and entrenchments, while others got as close as 400 yards (0.37 km) before dismounting to attack on foot.[Note 5] At the same time units of the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade were moving straight on Magdhaba in a southeasterly direction (following the telegraph line), and by 08:45 they were slowly advancing on foot in line. The 1st Light Horse Brigade followed the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade units in reserve.[44][45]

Map of Magdhaba, showing Ottoman redoubts in green and attacking forces in red

Ottoman Army batteries and trenches at Magdhaba were difficult to locate, but by 10:00 the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade was advancing towards their firing line. At this time, an aerial report described small groups of the garrison beginning to retreat. As a result the still-mounted 1st Light Horse Brigade was ordered to move directly on the town, passing the dismounted Imperial Camel Corps Brigade units on their way. After meeting severe shrapnel fire as they trotted over the open plain, they were forced to take cover in the Wadi el Arish. Dismounting in the wadi they continued their advance at 10:30 against the Ottoman left, while the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade units continued their advance over the flat ground for 900 yards (820 m), covering fire provided by each section in turn.[41][44]

Advance of the 9th Light Horse Regiment (3rd L. H. Brigade)

By 12:00 all brigades were hotly engaged, as the 3rd Light Horse commenced a sweep round the garrison's right flank. An hour later the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade units' right had advanced to reach the 1st Light Horse Brigade and 55 minutes later the fierce fighting was beginning to tell on the Ottoman garrison. There continued to be reports of small numbers of troops retreating, and at 14:15 the 10th Light Horse Regiment began making their way round the left. By 14:55 the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade units were within 500 yards (460 m) of the Ottoman defences and, with the 1st Light Horse Brigade, at 15:20 they attacked the garrison's No. 2 redoubt. Ten minutes later the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade (with fixed bayonets) swarmed over the trenches to the east of the houses; the 10th Light Horse Regiment (advancing from the south) captured two trenches on that side, so that all retreat to the Ottoman garrison was cut off. At 16:00 the Light Horse captured No. 2 redoubt, and Chaytor reported gaining buildings and redoubts on the left. After a telephone call between Chauvel and Chetwode, pressure continued to be exerted and an attack by all units took place at 16:30. The Ottoman garrison held on until the dismounted attackers were within 20 yards (18 m); inaccurate shooting by the defenders was responsible for only light casualties. By that time, there was no doubt that the Ottoman Army was losing the fight; the garrison began to surrender in small groups. All organised resistance ceased 10 minutes later and as darkness fell, sporadic firing petered out; prisoners were rounded up and horses collected and watered at the captured wells. Chauvel rode into Magdhaba and gave the order to clear the battlefield.[45][46]

Based on a firm appreciation of the situation, the attack was carried out with confidence, skill and boldness.[47]

Casualties and captures

Allied casualties were 5 officers killed and 7 wounded, 17 other ranks killed and 117 wounded – a total of 12 killed and 134 wounded (the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade had 2 officers, 7 men and 36 other ranks wounded) – and the loss of 146 men, 22 of them killed.[22][48][49]

Military staff at Magdabah before the attack

No more than 200 Ottomans escaped before being captured. The surviving garrison of 1,250 was captured, and there may have been 1,242 to 1,282 prisoners.[50][51] Those captured included Khadir Bey (commanding the 80th Regiment), Izzat Bey (commanding the 2/80th Battalion), Rushti Bey (commanding the 3/80th Battalion) and 43 officers. Over 300 Ottoman Army soldiers were killed; 97 were buried on the battlefield, and 40 wounded were cared for.[22][31][35][49]

Aftermath

With the victory at Magdhaba the occupation of El Arish (the first town on the Mediterranean Sea) was secured, and the 52nd Infantry Division quickly fortified the town. The Royal Navy arrived on 22 December 1916, and supplies began landing on the beaches on 24 December. With the arrival of the railway on 4 January 1917 (followed by the water pipeline), El Arish quickly developed into a major base for the Allied army.[52][28]

After their defeat at Magdhaba aerial reconnaissance found Ottoman forces moving their headquarters from Beersheba, while the garrison at El Auja was slightly increased. Other Ottoman outposts at El Kossaima and Nekhl remained, along with the strong defensive system of trenches and redoubts at El Magruntein (defending Rafa on the frontier between Egypt and Ottoman territory).[53][54]

The victors

In an address to the troops after the battle, Chetwode (the recently-arrived commander of Desert Column) expressed his appreciation for the mounted rifle and light-horse method of attack. He said that in the history of warfare he had never known cavalry to not only locate and surround the opponent's position, but to dismount and fight as infantry with rifle and bayonet.[55]

The ANZAC Mounted Division had left El Arish carrying only one water bottle per man, which was insufficient water to cover a round trip to Magdhaba of at least 24 hours. Additional water was organised by Desert Column staff, and sent from El Arish to Lahfan; a water convoy from Lahfan ordered to move to Magdhaba at 15:10 was reported to be on its way at 15:30.[56] It was only after filling up from the water convoy that the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and 3rd Light Horse Brigades were able to leave Magdhaba. They marched back in their own time, drawing rations and forage at Lahfan; ahead of them Divisional Headquarters, Anzac Mounted Division and an escort had left Magdhaba at 23:30, reaching El Arish at 04:10 on 24 December 1916.[42][49][57]

Clearing the battleground

Lieutenant Colonel Granville with part of his own regiment; the 1st Light Horse, two squadrons of the Auckland Mounted Rifle Regiment and one squadron from 3rd Light Horse Brigade bivouacked for the night at Magdhaba and continued clearing the battlefield the next morning. Convoys with supplies were ordered up to support these troops.[49][57] Material assistance was given to the returning columns by the GOC of the 52nd Infantry Division in the loan of camels, fantasses, sandcarts and gun teams, the latter going out on the GOC's own initiative to meet the returning teams.[49]

A dressing station set up 3 miles (4.8 km) west of Magdhaba by the New Zealand Field Ambulance Mobile Section and 1st Light Horse Field Ambulance treated 80 wounded during the day of battle; urgent surgery was performed, tetanus inoculations administered and patients given nourishment. These cases were evacuated during the night by sandcarts and torturous camel cacolets to El Arish, with the No. 1 Ambulance Convoy assisting. The remaining wounded (44 Allied and 66 Ottomans, collected on 23 and 24 December) were taken to an Ottoman hospital within the fortifications and later were sent to the dressing-station; from there, at 17:00 the ambulance convoy set out on its 23 miles (37 km) march to the receiving station. The convoys were met a few miles from El Arish by sandcarts lent by the 52nd Infantry Division; the wounded who had endured the cacolets travelled in comfort to the receiving station, arriving at 04:00 on 25 December. The 52nd Infantry Division supplied medical stores and personnel to assist and although arrangements were made for evacuation to the railhead two days later, evacuation by sea was planned. Due to a gale with rain and hail on 27 December this could not be carried out; on 29 December the largest single ambulance convoy organised in the campaign (77 sandcarts, 9 sledges and a number of cacolet camels) moved out in three lines along the beach with 150 wounded. A few, who could not be moved, were evacuated the following day to Kantara on the Suez Canal.[58][59]

Criticism

Kress von Kressenstein has been accused of withdrawing his troops and leaving the garrison at Magdhaba isolated.[43][60]

Chauvel has been accused of deciding to withdraw:

Battle honours

On 28 September 1917 Chauvel wrote to General Headquarters, "The point is now that, during the period covered by Sir Archibald's Despatch of 1–3–17, the Australia and New Zealand Troops well know that, with the exception of the 5th Mounted Brigade and some Yeomanry Companies of the I.C.C., they were absolutely the only troops engaged with the enemy on this front and yet they see that they have again got a very small portion indeed of the hundreds of Honours and Rewards (including mentions in Despatches) that have been granted. My Lists when commanding the A. & N.Z. Mounted Division, were modest ones under all the circumstances and in that perhaps I am partly to blame but, as you will see by attached list, a good many of my recommendations were cut out and in some cases those recommended for decorations were not even mentioned in Despatches." [65]

Notes

Footnotes
  1. ^ The Battles Nomenclature Committee assigned 'Affair' to those engagements between forces smaller than a division; 'Action' to engagements between divisions and 'Battle' to engagements between corps.[Battles Nomenclature Committee 1922 p. 7]
  2. ^ El Kossaima has been described as railhead [Bruce 2002, p. 81] but Keogh's Map 3 shows railhead at el Auja. Both Wavell and Powles refer to 15 miles of line being destroyed on 23 May 1917 on the railway from Beersheba to Auja. [Wavell 1968, p. 90 & Powles 1922, pp. 110, 113]
  3. ^ Map 3 shows the position of Auja, Magdhaba and Beersheba.
  4. ^ The 2nd Light Horse Brigade was based south of el Ruag and the Bardawil, at Hod el Hassania with units patrolling the area to Bir el Magerbra in the south and Hod el Ge'eila, Hod Willegha, Bir Jameil, Hod um weigh Gamel and Bir Bayud in the east.
  5. ^ While fighting dismounted, one quarter of the yeomanry, light horse and riflemen were holding the horses; a brigade was then equivalent in rifle strength to an infantry battalion. [Preston 1921 p.168]
Citations
  1. ^ Battles Nomenclature Committee 1922, p. 31
  2. ^ Keogh 1955, p. 56
  3. ^ Kressenstein, Friedrich Freiherr Kress von, Mit den Tèurken zum Suezkanal, (1938), pp 207–8.
  4. ^ a b Bruce 2002, p. 79
  5. ^ Wavell 1968, pp. 57–9
  6. ^ a b c d Keogh 1955, p. 71
  7. ^ a b Bruce 2002, p. 80
  8. ^ a b c d Powles 1922, p. 50
  9. ^ a b Powles 1922, p. 47
  10. ^ a b Powles 1922, p. 46
  11. ^ Keogh 1955, p.26 Map 3
  12. ^ Downes 1938, p. 590
  13. ^ Keogh 1955, p. 72
  14. ^ Powles 1922 pp. 44–5
  15. ^ Powles 1922, p. 66
  16. ^ Keogh 1955 p. 62
  17. ^ Cutlack 1941, p. 45-6
  18. ^ National Archives of Australia B2455 Chauvel H.G.; Statement of Service 18/12/1925; pp. 121–2
  19. ^ Keogh 1955 p. 60
  20. ^ Downes 1938 p. 589
  21. ^ Hill 1978, p. 85
  22. ^ a b c d Woodward 2003, p. 53
  23. ^ Hill 1978, p. 86
  24. ^ AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24 p. 1 and Appendix 25 Sketch Map
  25. ^ Cutlack 1941, p. 48
  26. ^ AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24 p. 2
  27. ^ Keogh 1955, p. 74
  28. ^ a b Bruce 2002, p. 82
  29. ^ AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24 pp. 3 & 31
  30. ^ Turkish General Staff, Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Turk harbi. Sina–Filistin cephesi, Harbin Başlangicindan İkinci Gazze Muharebeleri Sonuna Kadar, IVncu Cilt 1nci Kisim, Ankara 1979, p. 429.
  31. ^ a b Dennis et al 2008, p. 405
  32. ^ Cutlack 1941, pp. 43–4
  33. ^ Powles 1922,pp. 69–70
  34. ^ Kressenstein, Friedrich Freiherr Kress von, Mit den Tèurken zum Suezkanal, (1938), pp 207–8.
  35. ^ a b c Bruce 2002, p. 84
  36. ^ AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24 p. 31
  37. ^ Powles 1922, pp. 48–9 and Map of Magdhaba
  38. ^ AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24 pp. 3–4 and Appendix 25 Sketch Map
  39. ^ a b AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24 pp. 3–8
  40. ^ Cutlack 1941, pp. 45–9
  41. ^ a b Powles 1922, p. 51
  42. ^ a b c Hill 1978, p. 89
  43. ^ a b Bruce 2002, p. 83
  44. ^ a b AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24 p. 4
  45. ^ a b Powles 1922, pp. 51–3
  46. ^ AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24 pp. 6–8
  47. ^ Powles 1922, pp. 55–6
  48. ^ Powles 1922 pp. 55–6
  49. ^ a b c d e AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24 p. 8
  50. ^ Cutlack 1941, p. 49
  51. ^ Powles 1922 pp. 55–6
  52. ^ Carver 2003, p.194
  53. ^ Cutlack 1941, pp. 49–51
  54. ^ Gullett 1941, p. 230
  55. ^ Powles 1922, p. 57
  56. ^ AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24 p. 7
  57. ^ a b Powles 1922, p. 54
  58. ^ Downes 1938, pp. 592–3
  59. ^ Powles 1922, p. 61
  60. ^ Keogh 1955, p. 76–7
  61. ^ Bou 2009, p. 158
  62. ^ Cutlack, 1941, p. 50
  63. ^ Grainger 2006, p. 4
  64. ^ Downes 1938, p. 592
  65. ^ Hill 1978, p. 122

References

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